基于合作兼容的互联网信息服务业激励性监管研究

发布时间：2019-07-05 06:05

【摘要】：互联网信息服务企业在跨领域竞争时,由于产品间缺乏合作兼容的问题可能引发不正当竞争,进而影响消费者的利益和行业的健康发展。文章通过总结归纳互联网不正当竞争的案例和文献,构建以政府为委托人,互联网企业为代理人的委托代理模型,引入奖惩转移系数、合作兼容边际率、产出系数等影响因素,得到在完全信息和不完全信息下的最优激励合同,分析在不完全信息下总代理成本、政府收益、企业成本与各因素的正负相关性,并在此基础上运用matlab进行数据仿真,探讨实现合作兼容的有效途径。研究结果表明:在政府激励性管制下,通过增加奖惩转移系数或降低企业履行契约时的外在风险等方式可以激励企业实现合作兼容。
文内图片：ｍ确定的前提下令ｓ＝１，ｑ∈（０，２），ｄ∈（０，２），将各数值代入式（１２），得到图３。代理人的合作兼容努力水平与风险成反比，与奖惩转移系数成正比。当代理人面对的外在风险越大时，合作兼容努力水平与奖惩转移系数的斜率变化越大，则要求更多的

图片说明：ｍ确定的前提下令ｓ＝１，ｑ∈（０，２），ｄ∈（０，２），，将各数值代入式（１２），得到图３。代理人的合作兼容努力水平与风险成反比，与奖惩转移系数成正比。当代理人面对的外在风险越大时，合作兼容努力水平与奖惩转移系数的斜率变化越大，则要求更多的
[Abstract]:When Internet information service enterprises compete across fields, the lack of cooperation and compatibility between products may lead to unfair competition, which may affect the interests of consumers and the healthy development of the industry. By summing up the cases and literature of unfair competition on the Internet, this paper constructs the principal-agent model with the government as the principal and the Internet enterprise as the agent, introduces the factors such as reward and punishment transfer coefficient, cooperative compatibility margin rate, output coefficient and so on, obtains the optimal incentive contract under complete information and incomplete information, and analyzes the total agency cost and government income under incomplete information. The positive and negative correlation between enterprise cost and various factors is carried out, and on this basis, matlab is used to simulate the data, and the effective way to realize cooperation compatibility is discussed. The results show that under the government incentive control, enterprises can be encouraged to achieve cooperation and compatibility by increasing the transfer coefficient of rewards and punishments or reducing the external risk of enterprises performing the contract.
【作者单位】：重庆邮电大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金“互联网信息服务业市场行为演变与竞争秩序监管研究”(项目编号:14BGL107) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“互联网信息服务业产品扩散机制与管制模式研究”(项目编号:11YJA630071)的研究成果
【分类号】：F49

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