基于行为代理模型的企业研发投入驱动因素及其效应研究

发布时间：2018-03-25 05:10

本文选题：研发投入　切入点：业绩评价　出处：《华南理工大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：以往学者们主要从内部和外部两个角度对企业研发投入的驱动或影响因素进行研究,内部因素包括企业经营状况、董事会治理、股权结构等方面;外部因素包括行业特征、市场结构和政府政策等方面。企业经营业绩被视为研发的驱动因素是基于企业行为理论的观点,它反映了企业是否具备进行研发创新的动机和条件;公司治理机制成为研发的驱动因素之一则是以委托代理理论为依据的,即通过缓解或者消除股东和管理层之间的代理冲突,为管理层进行有利于创造股东价值的研发投入提供长效保障机制。本文基于已有研究,结合两类因素,从管理层个体的风险决策新视角对企业研发投入的驱动因素给出合理解释,同时,为我国上市公司的管理层激励机制和监督机制的优化设计提供参考。本文根据行为代理模型,将管理层风险偏好作为研发驱动因素的行为效应来源,在理论分析的基础上提出研究假设,并搜集和整理2007-2013年我国上市公司的研发等相关样本数据,通过构建以研发强度为因变量的多元回归模型,对上市公司业绩评价因素和公司治理因素的独立效应以及交互效应进行实证检验,此外,本文还探讨了企业科技属性对两类效应的影响。本文在实证检验过程中采用了固定效应模型和倾向值得分方法。研究发现:(1)业绩偏差并没有对企业研发投入产生显著的诱导效应,反而导致了管理层的保守行为;(2)管理层激励能够显著促进企业的研发投入;(3)业绩偏差与货币薪酬激励(股权激励)对研发投入产生了显著的负向(正向)交互驱动效应;(4)两职状态在高科技企业样本中具有显著的负向驱动效应,在结合业绩偏差后呈现出显著的负向交互驱动效应;(5)通过将样本分为高科技上市企业和非高科技上市企业两类,发现高科技上市企业的管理层激励对研发投入的驱动作用更为明显。因此,本文认为促进管理层的企业研发投入行为应当采用多种类型的激励模式,如股票期权、虚拟股权等,同时将管理层薪酬制度设计与企业业绩以及企业价值、研发成果等指标相挂钩,并进一步完善监事会和外部董事等监督机制,为企业的研发创新活动提供基础和保障,以有利于我国上市企业进一步转型升级和竞争力的提升。
[Abstract]:In the past, scholars mainly studied the driving and influencing factors of enterprise R & D investment from both internal and external perspectives. The internal factors include enterprise management, board of directors governance, equity structure and so on; external factors include industry characteristics. Market structure and government policy. Business performance is regarded as the driving factor of R & D based on the viewpoint of enterprise behavior theory, which reflects whether the enterprise has the motivation and conditions for R & D innovation. One of the driving factors of R & D is the corporate governance mechanism, which is based on the principal-agent theory, that is, by mitigating or eliminating the agency conflict between shareholders and management. This paper provides a long-term guarantee mechanism for the management to carry out R & D investment which is conducive to creating shareholder value. This paper combines two kinds of factors based on the existing research. This paper gives a reasonable explanation of the driving factors of R & D investment from the new perspective of individual risk decision of management, and provides a reference for the optimization design of management incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism of listed companies in China. Taking risk preference of management as the source of behavioral effect of R & D driver, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis on the basis of theoretical analysis, and collects and collates the relevant sample data of R & D of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2013. By constructing a multivariate regression model with R & D intensity as dependent variable, this paper empirically tests the independent and interactive effects of performance evaluation factors and corporate governance factors of listed companies. This paper also discusses the influence of enterprise science and technology attributes on two kinds of effects. In the process of empirical testing, this paper adopts a fixed effect model and a tendency to be subdivided. It is found that the performance deviation does not produce a firm R & D investment. Significant inductive effects, On the contrary, it leads to the conservative behavior of management. (2) Management incentives can significantly promote R & D investment of enterprises. (3) performance bias and monetary incentive (equity incentive) have a significant negative (positive) interaction drive on R & D investment. The state of two jobs has a significant negative driving effect in the sample of high-tech enterprises. In combination with the performance deviation, there is a significant negative interactive driving effect. By classifying the sample into high-tech listed enterprises and non-high-tech listed enterprises, It is found that the driving effect of management incentive on R & D investment in high-tech listed enterprises is more obvious. Therefore, this paper argues that the promotion of management's R & D investment behavior should adopt a variety of incentive modes, such as stock option, virtual equity, etc. At the same time, the design of the management compensation system is linked to the performance of the enterprise, the enterprise value, the research and development achievement, and so on, and the supervision mechanism such as the board of supervisors and the outside director is further improved, which provides the foundation and guarantee for the enterprise's R & D innovation activities. In order to help China's listed enterprises to further transformation and upgrading and competitiveness.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F273.1

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