中国上市公司退市事件的市场反应及影响因素研究
发布时间：2018-08-13 10:30
【摘要】：退市是上市公司由于未满足交易所的上市标准而被终止上市的情形,即由一家上市公司变为非上市公司。退市可分主动性退市和被动性退市。主动性退市一般因合并、收购或私有化导致；被动性退市则是由于公司无法达到股票交易管理机构对上市公司的要求。已有研究文献表明退市存在显著经济成本,包括降低股票价格、侵蚀流动性及增加波动性。中国证券监督管理委员会负责制定股票首次公开上市和退市的法规和标准。如果公司违反了某些小的规则,股票会被给予特别处理；如果公司严重违反了相关规则,这支股票会被给予退市风险警示或者直接被交易所摘牌。中国证券监督管理委员采用的退市过程让中国的股票退市标准显得尤为独特。目前在中国有关被动性退市对经济影响的研究不多,所以这成为了作者研究的动机。 另外,虽然之前的文献已经就财务变量(例如：破产和收购)、公司治理变量与企业绩效之间的关系做过研究,但对公司治理变量与股票被动性退市之间关系的研究不多。中国公司治理实践与美国或者德国／日本的模式非常不同。因此,检验中国公司治理实践对于退市的影响变得十分必要。这篇论文主要有两个研究目的：检验中国市场退市事件的市场反应,并评估中国公司治理结构对退市的影响。 与中国退市规则相关的上市状态变化事件包括：从正常到特别处理、正常到退市风险警示、退市风险警示到特别处理、退市风险警示到正常、特别处理到正常、特别处理到退市风险警示、以及被动性退市。为了检验退市事件的市场反应,我们选择1990-2012年之间在上海和深圳上市的1281支“A股”股票为样本,使用标准的事件研究方法来衡量这些事件的平均异常收益,使用市场模型测算正常报酬并使用均值调整报酬模型进行稳健性检验。我们发现,相对于正面事件公告,市场对负面事件公告的反应更为敏感；就状态之间转换的市场反应而言,正常与退市风险警示之间转换的市场反应明显强于正常与特别处理之间和(或)特别处理与退市风险警示之间的市场反应；退市公司股票价格平均下跌85%,股东承担明显的退市成本。上述与中国退市规则相关的各种事件经济成本的新的结论对投资者和监管者具有一定的指导作用。 为了检验中国公司治理对被动性退市的影响,我们使用了1990-2012年之间所有被动性退市的上海和深圳证券交易所“A股”样本,在控制行业和规模的基础上构建了退市和正常两个配对样本组,采用判别分析和Logistic回归来检验在退市前三个不同时期董事会特征和股权特征对退市的影响：退市前三年、退市前两年和退市前一年。我们使用下述董事会特征和股权特征变量来代表公司治理状况：董事会规模、董事会活跃性、董事会独立性、审计委员会、股东参与程度、内部人持股和股权集中度。 我们发现,股东参与程度和董事会独立性在退市前一年显著影响退市发生几率；董事会活跃性在退市前连续两年内显著影响；股权集中度在退市前三年和前两年内都显著影响,内部人持股在退市前所有三年内都有显著影响,而审计委员会和董事会规模对退市没有影响。我们大致得出结论,在中国,相较于董事会特征,股权特征能更显著地区分退市公司和正常公司。
[Abstract]:Delisting is a situation in which a listed company is terminated because it fails to meet the listing criteria of the exchange, i.e. it is changed from a listed company to a non-listed company. delisting can be divided into active delisting and passive delisting. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is responsible for formulating regulations and standards for the initial public offering and delisting of stocks. If a company violates certain minor rules, the stocks will be subject to the risk of being delisted. The delisting process adopted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission makes the delisting criteria of Chinese stocks particularly unique. Currently, there is no research on the economic impact of passive delisting in China. More, so this has become the motive of the author's research.
In addition, although previous literatures have studied the relationship between financial variables (e.g. bankruptcy and acquisition), corporate governance variables and corporate performance, little has been done on the relationship between corporate governance variables and passive delisting of stocks. It is necessary to examine the impact of Chinese corporate governance practices on delisting. This paper aims to examine the market response to delisting events in the Chinese market and assess the impact of Chinese corporate governance structure on delisting.
Listing status changes related to delisting rules in China include: from normal to special handling, normal to delisting risk warning, delisting risk warning to special handling, delisting risk warning to normal, special handling to normal, special handling to delisting risk warning, and passive delisting. We selected 1 281 A-share stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 1990 to 2012 as samples, used standard event research methods to measure the average abnormal returns of these events, used market models to measure normal returns and used mean-adjusted returns model to test the robustness. We found that, compared with positive event announcements, the market was open to the public. The response of the market to the announcement of negative events is more sensitive; as far as the market reaction to the transition between States is concerned, the market response to the transition between normal and delisting risk warnings is significantly stronger than that between normal and special treatment and/or between special treatment and delisting risk warnings; the average price of delisted stocks dropped by 85%, and shareholders accepted. These new conclusions of the economic costs of various events related to China's delisting rules have a guiding role for investors and regulators.
In order to test the effect of Chinese corporate governance on passive delisting, we use all passive delisting samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1990 to 2012 to construct two paired sample groups, delisting and normal, on the basis of industry and scale control. Discriminant analysis and Logistic regression are used to test the delisting. We use the following board characteristics and equity characteristics variables to represent corporate governance: board size, board activity, board independence, audit committee, shareholders'participation, and the extent of internal. Sector shareholding and ownership concentration.
We find that shareholder participation and board independence significantly affect the probability of delisting one year before delisting; board activity significantly affects delisting two consecutive years before delisting; ownership concentration significantly affects three years before delisting and two years before delisting; insider ownership significantly affects all three years before delisting, while auditing does. The size of the board and the board of directors has no effect on delisting. We generally conclude that in China, the shareholding characteristics are more prominent in distinguishing delisting companies from normal companies than the board characteristics.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F271
本文编号：2180704
[Abstract]:Delisting is a situation in which a listed company is terminated because it fails to meet the listing criteria of the exchange, i.e. it is changed from a listed company to a non-listed company. delisting can be divided into active delisting and passive delisting. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is responsible for formulating regulations and standards for the initial public offering and delisting of stocks. If a company violates certain minor rules, the stocks will be subject to the risk of being delisted. The delisting process adopted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission makes the delisting criteria of Chinese stocks particularly unique. Currently, there is no research on the economic impact of passive delisting in China. More, so this has become the motive of the author's research.
In addition, although previous literatures have studied the relationship between financial variables (e.g. bankruptcy and acquisition), corporate governance variables and corporate performance, little has been done on the relationship between corporate governance variables and passive delisting of stocks. It is necessary to examine the impact of Chinese corporate governance practices on delisting. This paper aims to examine the market response to delisting events in the Chinese market and assess the impact of Chinese corporate governance structure on delisting.
Listing status changes related to delisting rules in China include: from normal to special handling, normal to delisting risk warning, delisting risk warning to special handling, delisting risk warning to normal, special handling to normal, special handling to delisting risk warning, and passive delisting. We selected 1 281 A-share stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 1990 to 2012 as samples, used standard event research methods to measure the average abnormal returns of these events, used market models to measure normal returns and used mean-adjusted returns model to test the robustness. We found that, compared with positive event announcements, the market was open to the public. The response of the market to the announcement of negative events is more sensitive; as far as the market reaction to the transition between States is concerned, the market response to the transition between normal and delisting risk warnings is significantly stronger than that between normal and special treatment and/or between special treatment and delisting risk warnings; the average price of delisted stocks dropped by 85%, and shareholders accepted. These new conclusions of the economic costs of various events related to China's delisting rules have a guiding role for investors and regulators.
In order to test the effect of Chinese corporate governance on passive delisting, we use all passive delisting samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1990 to 2012 to construct two paired sample groups, delisting and normal, on the basis of industry and scale control. Discriminant analysis and Logistic regression are used to test the delisting. We use the following board characteristics and equity characteristics variables to represent corporate governance: board size, board activity, board independence, audit committee, shareholders'participation, and the extent of internal. Sector shareholding and ownership concentration.
We find that shareholder participation and board independence significantly affect the probability of delisting one year before delisting; board activity significantly affects delisting two consecutive years before delisting; ownership concentration significantly affects three years before delisting and two years before delisting; insider ownership significantly affects all three years before delisting, while auditing does. The size of the board and the board of directors has no effect on delisting. We generally conclude that in China, the shareholding characteristics are more prominent in distinguishing delisting companies from normal companies than the board characteristics.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F271
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前3条
1 李晓玲;丁佳佳;;退市制度对上市公司盈余管理影响的实证研究[J];安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版);2007年06期
2 项雪平;上市公司退市制度研究[J];河北法学;2004年03期
3 郭智,杨春鹏;我国上市公司退市机制的运行现状及完善[J];价值工程;2004年09期
，本文编号：2180704
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/touziyanjiulunwen/2180704.html
