上市公司股权激励与股利分配政策研究

发布时间：2018-05-08 04:39

本文选题：股权激励 + 股利分配　；参考：《山东财经大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代企业两权分离的制度背景下,由于利益相关者之间存在严重的利益冲突以及信息不对称性,便产生了委托代理问题,如何平衡好委托人与代理人之间的关系以及降低代理成本是各大公司重点关注的问题,也是国内外学者致力于研究的问题之一。根据股利代理成本理论,实施高股利支付率政策有利于降低因经理人与股东之间代理冲突而引发的代理成本;而股权激励通过向公司经理人赋予一定的公司股权,使其与股东共享利益、共担风险,从而使二者利益目标趋同,降低代理成本。那么,同样是解决代理问题的两种途径,股利分配政策是否会因为股权激励的实施发生变化呢?本文以2006年1月1日《上市公司股权激励管理办法》正式实施以来,截止2013年12月31日首次披露股权激励计划并实施的A股上市公司为研究对象,采用实证方法研究分析了中国上市公司中实施了股权激励计划的公司,其股权激励方案推出前和股权激励方案推出后对股利支付水平有何影响?不同的股权激励模式对股利政策的影响有何不同?在中国上市公司特殊治理环境的下,公司高管是否会为了争取自身期权价值最大化而在股利分配政策制定过程中产生某种机会主义行为?本文从上述几个角度出发,对股权激励和股利分配政策二者之间的关系展开探讨。本文共分六章:第一章为绪论,主要介绍里研究背景与研究意义,研究方法与研究框架以及创新之处;第二章为文献综述,从国内外角度对股权激励与股利分配的关系、管理层权力与股权激励和股利分配关系的研究现状进行梳理;第三章为相关理论,首先介绍了股权激励的相关概念,并介绍了股权激励的相关理论基础,包括委托代理理论、不完全契约理论、管理层权力理论;其次介绍了股利分配的相关理论,包括代理理论、信号理论、一鸟在手理论、税差理论、客户效应理论;第四章为研究设计,该部分主要是为下一章的实证分析提供准备,主要包括研究假设的提出、样本选择和数据来源、研究设计;第五章为实证分析,该部分采用线性回归分析法,进行实证检验,并作出实证分析。第六章为实证结论以及相关建议,主要是对前文实证分析的结论进行概括总结,并提出相关建议。本文通过对股权激励计划推出前后、股权激励模式、管理层权力这三个因素进行实证研究,得出如下结论:(1)在实施股权激励计划的上市公司中,相对于股权激励方案推出前,股权激励方案推出后有更低的股利支付水平;(2)相对于激励方案中采用限制性股票模式的公司,采用股票期权模式的公司更倾向于降低股利支付水平;(3)管理层权力越大,股权激励对股利分配的影响越小,越倾向于提高股利支付水平,以获取眼前利益。本文的创新点:(1)研究了不同的股权激励模式对股利政策的影响。(2)从纵向分析的视角来研究股权激励与股利分配政策的关系。(3)丰富了研究样本,对样本进行了更加详细的筛选。通过本文的实证研究,对中国上市公司股权激励与股利政策的制定和监管具有一定的参考价值:(1)设计股权激励方案时,应将股利支付行为纳入考虑,选择合理的股权激励模式。(2)为了保护其他股东的切身利益,应防止股权激励对象过度的操纵股利政策,加强对股利分配的监管和披露。(3)加强公司治理结构机制的建设,保证董事会的独立性,切勿使得管理层利用权力控制董事会决策制定。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the separation of two rights in modern enterprises, due to the serious conflict of interests and information asymmetry among the stakeholders, the problem of principal-agent is produced. How to balance the relationship between the principal and the agent and reduce the agency cost is the focus of the major companies, and also the scholars at home and abroad are devoted to research. One of the problems, according to the theory of the agency cost of dividend, the implementation of the high dividend payment rate policy is beneficial to reduce the agency cost caused by the agent conflict between the manager and the shareholders, and the equity incentive can share the interests with the shareholders and share the risk by giving the company managers a certain share of the company's equity, thus making the two party's interest goal. The same, reduce the agency cost. Then, the same is the two way to solve the agency problem, whether the dividend distribution policy will change because of the implementation of equity incentive? This paper, since the January 1, 2006 "listed company equity incentive management method >" since the formal implementation, the deadline for the first disclosure of equity incentive plan and the implementation of the A shares listed in December 31, 2013. The company is the research object and uses an empirical method to analyze the influence of the equity incentive scheme on the dividend payment level before the introduction of equity incentive scheme and the introduction of equity incentive scheme in Chinese listed companies. In order to control the environment, will the company executives produce some opportunistic behavior in the process of dividend distribution policy in order to maximize the value of their own options? From the above points, this paper discusses the relationship between the two parties. This article is divided into six chapters: the first chapter is the introduction. The research background and significance of research, research methods and research framework and innovation are introduced. The second chapter is literature review, the relationship between equity incentive and dividend distribution, the relationship between equity incentive and dividend distribution, the relationship between management power and equity incentive and dividend distribution, and the third chapter is related theory, first of all, the equity incentive is introduced. Related concepts, and introduce the theoretical basis of equity incentive, including principal-agent theory, incomplete contract theory, management level power theory. Secondly, it introduces the related theories of dividend distribution, including agency theory, signal theory, one bird in hand theory, tax difference theory, customer effect theory, and the fourth chapter is the research and design, this part is the main part It is to provide preparation for the empirical analysis of the next chapter, mainly including research hypothesis, sample selection and data sources, research and design; the fifth chapter is empirical analysis, this part uses linear regression analysis, empirical test, and empirical analysis. The sixth chapter is the empirical conclusion and related suggestions, mainly to the previous empirical analysis. The conclusions are summarized and some suggestions are put forward. Through the empirical study on the three factors of equity incentive model and management power, the following conclusions are made: (1) in the listed companies carrying out the equity incentive plan, the equity incentive scheme is more than before the introduction of the equity incentive scheme. Low dividend payment level; (2) the company adopting the stock option model is more inclined to lower the dividend payment level relative to the incentive scheme adopting the restrictive stock mode. (3) the greater the power of the management, the smaller the influence of the equity incentive to the dividend distribution, the more inclined to raise the dividend payment level, in order to gain the immediate interest. New points: (1) study the influence of different equity incentive modes on dividend policy. (2) study the relationship between equity incentive and dividend distribution policy from the perspective of vertical analysis. (3) enrich the research samples and make more detailed screening of samples. Through this empirical study, the ownership incentive and dividend policy of Chinese listed companies is made. Definite and supervision have certain reference value: (1) when designing the equity incentive scheme, we should take the dividend payment behavior into consideration and choose reasonable equity incentive mode. (2) in order to protect the interests of other shareholders, it is necessary to prevent the excessive manipulation of dividend policy by the shareholders and strengthen the supervision and disclosure of the dividend distribution. (3) strengthen the corporate governance. To ensure the independence of the board of directors, we should not make management use the power to control the decision-making of the board of directors.

【学位授予单位】：山东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F275;F272.92

【参考文献】