国资控股公司股权激励方案设计特征分析

发布时间：2018-05-10 06:48

本文选题：股权激励 + 方案设计　；参考：《安徽财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权激励作为公司管理的一种长期激励手段,在有效减少委托代理成本、激励高管努力工作以及提高公司业绩水平等方面拥有不可替代的重要作用。然而西方的理论和实践已经表明股权激励实施会存在问题。2006年《上市公司股权激励管理办法》的出台拉开了我国股权激励的序幕,越来越多的企业开始实施股权激励。当前国内的相关研究大多基于股权激励与公司业绩关系的检验,很少从方案设计角度考察股权激励有效性。如果设计不合理,必定会影响到实施效果。有鉴于此,本文以国资控股公司的激励方案特征为对象展开研究。选择了从2006年至今的400多家上市公司,通过大样本的统计分析和国企生益科技、民企得润电子的具体方案比较分析,来研究股权激励的有效性。结果发现我国国资控股企业在激励方案设计上存在以下问题：(1)激励模式单一,大多使用股票期权和限制性股票,其他模式很少涉及。(2)激励对象集中,国企主要是高管居多,核心技术人员少,民企比较平均。(3)有效期较短,国企一般3到5年,民营多数5年以上。(4)行权价格偏低,国企平均价格低于民营企业。(5)考核指标单一,基本是净资产收益率、净利润增长率等财务指标,很少选取非财务指标。这些问题都表明国资控股企业存在的治理结构和内部人控制问题使股权激励成为高管谋取私利的手段。本文研究结果意味着要想让国有企业的股权激励更加有效,我们必须关注和强化激励方案设计的重要性。并通过完善公司治理结构、健全法律法规和市场机制以及改进设计方法等措施来优化国资控股公司股权激励的发展。这样才能使股权激励方案效果更加明显。
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive in corporate management, equity incentive plays an irreplaceable role in reducing the cost of principal-agent, encouraging executives to work hard and improving the level of corporate performance. However, the western theory and practice have shown that there will be problems in the implementation of equity incentive. In 2006, the introduction of "Stock incentive Management measures of listed companies" opened the prologue of equity incentive in China, and more and more enterprises began to implement equity incentive. At present, most of the domestic researches are based on the test of the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, and rarely investigate the effectiveness of equity incentive from the point of view of scheme design. If the design is not reasonable, will certainly affect the implementation effect. In view of this, this paper focuses on the characteristics of incentive schemes of state-owned holding companies. More than 400 listed companies from 2006 to now have been selected to study the effectiveness of equity incentive through statistical analysis of large samples and comparative analysis of the specific schemes of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. The results show that there are the following problems in the incentive scheme design of state-owned holding enterprises in China: (1) the incentive model is single, most of them use stock options and restricted stocks, and the other models rarely involve the concentration of incentive objects. The majority of state-owned enterprises are senior executives. The number of core technicians is small, the average validity period of private enterprises is relatively short, the state-owned enterprises are generally three to five years old, the private majority of them are more than five years old, the price of exercising power is on the low side, the average price of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of the private enterprises, and the assessment index is single, and basically is the rate of return on net assets. Net profit growth rate and other financial indicators, rarely select non-financial indicators. These problems indicate that the governance structure and insider control of state-owned holding enterprises make equity incentive a means for executives to seek personal benefits. The result of this paper means that in order to make the equity incentive of state-owned enterprises more effective, we must pay attention to and strengthen the importance of incentive scheme design. Through perfecting the corporate governance structure, perfecting the laws, regulations and market mechanism, and improving the design method to optimize the development of the equity incentive of the state-owned holding company. Only in this way can the effect of equity incentive scheme be more obvious.
【学位授予单位】：安徽财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F276.6

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