公司内部薪酬差距对盈余管理影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-08-24 10:21

【摘要】：近年来,盈余管理在会计学研究领域是公众关心的热门问题。目前,我国存在会计法规体系不完善、外部监管部门监管措施不力的状况,公司管理层以报酬契约、债务契约、避税和融资为动机的盈余管理行为经常发生,导致我国会计信息失真的情况较为严重。现代企业制度的特点是所有权与经营权分离,公司高管的经营管理能力对企业的发展至关重要,为了激励高管努力工作,所有者给高管安排了各种各样的薪酬激励形式。但随着高管薪酬披露制度越来越透明,高管的巨额薪酬逐渐引起了社会公众的质疑,社会公众关注的焦点也逐渐转移到了薪酬差距的问题上。本文以2013年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,运用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法考察了公司内部高管之间薪酬差距及高管与普通员工之间薪酬差距对盈余管理程度的影响。本文首先利用文献综述法对薪酬差距以及薪酬差距对盈余管理影响的相关国内外文献进行了梳理和分析,并对委托代理理论、相对剥削理论和公平理论等相关基础理论进行阐述,在此基础上进行公司内部薪酬差距对盈余管理影响的理论分析并提出研究假设。然后经过四个步骤的筛选,以2013年沪深A股2032家上市公司为样本,运用线性回归的方法分析我国公司内部薪酬差距对盈余管理的影响。研究结果为高管内部薪酬差距对盈余管理有正向影响,即高管内部薪酬差距使高管产生的不公平感和被剥削感能够引起高管的盈余管理行为。最后在线性回归模型中进一步引入了公司的股权性质、公司是否处于股权融资期间以及公司是否处于高管股票期权行权期间作为调节变量,探讨企业在不同股权性质下及特定事件期间时高管内部薪酬差距对盈余管理的影响。实证结果显示,国有企业高管内部薪酬差距对盈余管理的影响程度更强;公司处于股权融资期间,对高管内部薪酬差距影响盈余管理的作用有反向调节效应;公司处于高管股票行权期间,对高管薪酬差距影响盈余管理的作用有正向的调节效应。除此之外,高管与员工的薪酬差距与盈余管理程度也呈显著正相关关系。
[Abstract]:In recent years, earnings management in the field of accounting research is a hot issue of public concern. At present, there are imperfect accounting laws and regulations in our country, and the supervision measures of external regulatory departments are weak. Earnings management behavior motivated by compensation contracts, debt contracts, tax avoidance and financing often occurs in the management of companies. The distortion of accounting information in China is more serious. The modern enterprise system is characterized by the separation of ownership and management, and the management ability of the executives is very important to the development of the enterprise. In order to encourage the executives to work hard, the owner arranges a variety of salary incentives for the executives. However, with the transparency of executive compensation disclosure system, the huge executive pay has gradually aroused public doubt, and the focus of public attention has gradually shifted to the issue of pay gap. This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2013 as the research object, using the method of normative research and empirical research to investigate the effect of salary gap between executives and ordinary employees on earnings management. In this paper, we first use literature review method to sort out and analyze the pay gap and the effect of salary gap on earnings management, and then analyze the principal-agent theory. The relative exploitation theory and equity theory are discussed. On this basis, the theoretical analysis of the effect of internal pay gap on earnings management is carried out and the research hypotheses are put forward. Then through four steps of screening, taking 2032 listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares as samples in 2013, this paper uses linear regression method to analyze the influence of internal pay gap on earnings management in Chinese companies. The results show that the internal pay gap has a positive impact on earnings management, that is, the unfair and exploitative sense of internal pay gap can lead to earnings management behavior. Finally, in the linear regression model, the author further introduces the equity nature of the company, whether the company is in the period of equity financing and whether the company is in the executive stock option exercise period as a regulating variable. This paper discusses the effect of internal pay gap on earnings management under different ownership and specific events. The empirical results show that the internal pay gap of state-owned enterprises has a stronger impact on earnings management, while the company is in the period of equity financing, the effect of internal pay gap on earnings management has a reverse adjustment effect. During the executive stock exercise, the company has a positive adjustment effect on the effect of executive pay gap on earnings management. In addition, there is a significant positive correlation between executive and employee pay gap and earnings management.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F272.92;F275

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