终极控制权、产品市场竞争对盈余管理影响的研究

发布时间：2018-03-24 18:24

本文选题：盈余管理　切入点：终极控制权　出处：《江苏师范大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：盈余管理问题,不仅是公司财务会计领域的研究课题,也是公司治理领域的研究课题,倍受学术界的关注。大量研究表明,我国上市公司股权结构高度集中,并且存在终极控股股东,公司终极控股股东以较少现金流权获取较大控制权,导致其更有动机和能力攫取其他股东的利益。同时,产品市场竞争日趋激烈,直接或间接影响着公司的生产经营决策。基于此,本文尝试将作为公司内部治理结构内容中的终极控制权与作为公司外部治理机制内容中的产品市场竞争纳入统一框架,探寻两者对公司盈余管理的影响。本文在梳理国内外相关文献的基础上,对盈余管理进行了理论透视,且分别对终极控制权影响盈余管理、产品市场竞争影响盈余管理进行了理论分析。实证研究样本来自2010~2015年我国A股上市公司数据,经过剔除后共选取1203家上市公司,共计7218个研究样本,并依据终极控股股东性质区分了国有和非国有样本,且从应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余两个角度测度盈余管理程度,从行业内与行业间两个角度衡量产品市场竞争程度。在此基础上,将实证分析分为三大部分,分别提出假设、构建多个多元回归方程、进行回归结果分析、稳健性检验,以期较为系统地研究终极控制权对盈余管理的影响、产品市场竞争对盈余管理的影响以及终极控制权和产品市场竞争的交互作用对盈余管理的影响。通过实证研究,得到以下结论:第一,终极控股股东拥有的控制权比例越高,公司的盈余管理程度越高;第二,终极控股股东的两权分离程度与公司盈余管理呈正相关关系;第三,终极控股股东为非国有的公司,其盈余管理程度高于终极控股股东为国有的公司;第四,公司在行业内拥有的产品市场势力越强,其盈余管理程度越低;第五,具有较高产品市场竞争程度的行业,企业的盈余管理程度越高;第六,相对于终极控股股东为非国有企业的公司,行业内的产品市场势力对国有控股企业进行盈余管理行为的抑制作用更强;行业间的产品市场竞争对国有控股企业进行盈余管理行为的诱发作用较弱;第七,终极控股股东两权分离程度越高,越会削弱产品市场势力对盈余管理程度的抑制作用;越会加剧行业间产品市场竞争对公司盈余管理程度的诱发作用。基于研究结论,提出以下对策建议:第一,推行和完善会计信息披露制度,保障相关准则执行力度;第二,限制终极控股股东控制权与现金流权的两权分离,缩短企业间控制链条;第三,营造良好的市场竞争氛围,善于利用产品市场竞争的积极治理作用。
[Abstract]:Earnings management is not only a research topic in the field of corporate finance and accounting, but also a research topic in the field of corporate governance. A large number of studies show that the ownership structure of listed companies in China is highly concentrated. And there are ultimate controlling shareholders, the ultimate controlling shareholders of the company obtain greater control rights with less cash flow right, which leads to its more motive and ability to seize the interests of other shareholders. At the same time, the competition in the product market is becoming more and more fierce. Based on this, this paper attempts to bring into the unified framework the ultimate control right as the content of the internal corporate governance structure and the product market competition as the content of the corporate external governance mechanism. On the basis of combing the relevant literature at home and abroad, this paper makes a theoretical perspective on earnings management, and respectively affects earnings management on the ultimate control right. This paper analyzes the influence of product market competition on earnings management theoretically. The empirical research samples are from the data of A share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2015. After eliminating 1203 listed companies, a total of 7218 research samples are selected. According to the nature of ultimate controlling shareholder, the paper distinguishes state-owned and non-state-owned samples, and measures the degree of earnings management from two angles of accrual earnings management and real activity earnings. On the basis of this, the empirical analysis is divided into three parts. The hypothesis is put forward, multiple regression equations are constructed, the regression results are analyzed, and the robustness test is carried out. In order to systematically study the impact of ultimate control on earnings management, the impact of product market competition on earnings management, and the interaction of ultimate control and product market competition on earnings management. The conclusions are as follows: first, the higher the proportion of control rights owned by the ultimate controlling shareholder, the higher the degree of earnings management; second, the degree of separation of the two rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder is positively related to the earnings management of the company; third, The ultimate controlling shareholder is a non-state-owned company, its earnings management degree is higher than that of the ultimate controlling shareholder company; fourth, the stronger the market power of the company in the industry, the lower the earnings management degree. The higher the degree of earnings management, the higher the degree of earnings management. Sixth, compared to the ultimate controlling shareholder, the company is a non-state-owned enterprise. The product market forces in the industry can restrain the earnings management behavior of the state-owned holding enterprises more strongly; the product market competition among the industries has a weaker effect on the earnings management behavior of the state-owned holding enterprises; seventh, The higher the degree of separation of the ultimate controlling shareholder's two rights, the more it will weaken the restraining effect of the product market power to the earnings management degree, and will aggravate the inducement effect of the product market competition to the earnings management degree of the company. Put forward the following countermeasures and suggestions: first, promote and improve the accounting information disclosure system to ensure the enforcement of relevant standards; second, limit the ultimate controlling shareholder control and cash flow rights separation, shorten the chain of control between enterprises; third, Create a good market competition atmosphere, good at making use of the positive governance role of product market competition.
【学位授予单位】：江苏师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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