大股东的股权质押与市值管理
发布时间：2018-10-12 16:03
【摘要】：随着2013年沪深交易所通过金融创新开展股票质押式回购以来,上市公司进行股权质押的融资行为已经越来越普遍,根据wind数据库统计,在2016年一年参与股票质押的上市公司多达1600多家,超过我国A股证券市场上市公司数量的一半,而且有的上市公司一年不止发生一次股权质押行为,例如2016年发生股权质押融资次数最多的是上海莱士(002252.sz),多达87次,几乎每个月有7次之多,根据笔者2016年统计质押次数前10的公司平均发生52.3次股权质押行为。如此普遍频繁的股权质押行为是否会对上市公司的市值管理带来影响呢?本文基于这样的疑问通过对A股中2010年起到2016年一季度之间发生过控股股东股权质押的上市公司进行筛选分析研究发现:1,控股股东的股权质押行为确实有助于上市公司加强市值管理,但频繁的股权质押行为却会削弱市值管理效果;2,控股股东和中小股东同时存在股权质押时市值管理行为会明显强于仅仅只有控股股东存在质押行为时的情况,也即控股股东和中小股东的股权质押行为对市值管理产生协同效应;3,不同企业属性的控股股东发生股权质押行为时市值管理情况也会显著不同,当民营企业的控股股东发生股权质押时,民营上市公司会有更明显的市值管理。最后,根据本文的结论提出防范股权质押风险和加强市值管理的相关政策建议。
[Abstract]:Since 2013, when Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange launched stock pledge repurchase through financial innovation, the financing behavior of stock pledge by listed companies has become more and more common. According to wind database statistics, In 2016, as many as 1600 listed companies participated in stock pledge, more than half of the number of listed companies in China's A-share stock market, and some listed companies have more than once a year stock pledge behavior. For example, in 2016, the largest amount of equity pledge financing occurred was Shanghai 002252.sz (87 times), almost seven times a month. According to the author's 2016 statistics, the companies with the top 10 pledge times on average have 52.3 times of equity pledge behavior. Will such frequent stock pledge affect the market value management of listed companies? Based on this question, this paper makes a screening analysis of the listed companies in A shares that have pledged the shares of controlling shareholders between 2010 and the first quarter of 2016. The results show that: 1. City companies to strengthen market value management, However, the frequent behavior of equity pledge will weaken the effect of market value management. 2, the market value management behavior of controlling shareholder and small shareholder is obviously stronger than that of only controlling shareholder. That is, the equity pledge behavior of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders has a synergistic effect on market value management. When controlling shareholders of private enterprises pledge shares, private listed companies will have more obvious market value management. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on preventing the risk of equity pledge and strengthening market value management.
【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51
本文编号：2266742
[Abstract]:Since 2013, when Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange launched stock pledge repurchase through financial innovation, the financing behavior of stock pledge by listed companies has become more and more common. According to wind database statistics, In 2016, as many as 1600 listed companies participated in stock pledge, more than half of the number of listed companies in China's A-share stock market, and some listed companies have more than once a year stock pledge behavior. For example, in 2016, the largest amount of equity pledge financing occurred was Shanghai 002252.sz (87 times), almost seven times a month. According to the author's 2016 statistics, the companies with the top 10 pledge times on average have 52.3 times of equity pledge behavior. Will such frequent stock pledge affect the market value management of listed companies? Based on this question, this paper makes a screening analysis of the listed companies in A shares that have pledged the shares of controlling shareholders between 2010 and the first quarter of 2016. The results show that: 1. City companies to strengthen market value management, However, the frequent behavior of equity pledge will weaken the effect of market value management. 2, the market value management behavior of controlling shareholder and small shareholder is obviously stronger than that of only controlling shareholder. That is, the equity pledge behavior of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders has a synergistic effect on market value management. When controlling shareholders of private enterprises pledge shares, private listed companies will have more obvious market value management. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on preventing the risk of equity pledge and strengthening market value management.
【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51
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