欧盟的普惠制的WTO合法性

发布时间：2016-03-15 17:28

Abstract 

在EC - 特惠关税，上诉机构认为，世贸组织授权条款允许发达国家比给别人，在一定条件下给予更好的关税待遇，一些发展中国家。它还认为，这些条件未得到欧盟的所谓“药物的安排”，额外自选设置的系统（通常免税处理），欧盟已经决定均需要特殊的关税优惠某些国家见面，感谢他们参与打击毒品生产和贩运。针对这一裁决，当欧盟在2005年重申了其普惠制方案，它取代了毒品安排和两个相似的，虽然不那么大方，劳工和环境与俗称的“GSP +安排”的新安排安排。在这种安排下，，额外的关税优惠（一般免税待遇），分别提供给发展中国家的承诺批准和执行人权和良好治理公约清单。根据欧盟普惠制+安排与授权条款的上诉机构的解释的规定。本文认为，事实并非如此。这是因为首先，欧盟选择的选择GSP +受益者实质性标准，不符合上诉机构的标准差分关税待遇的发展中国家。其次，这是因为欧盟的要求，即可能的受益者必须在某一日期已经应用，复制受益人“封闭名单”，这是致命的欧盟普惠制方案的早期化身的问题。文章最后设计一个GSP +安排更容易满足上诉机构的条件比欧盟目前的安排提出了一些建议。In EC – Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body held that the WTO Enabling Clause permitted developed countries to grant better tariff treatment to some developing countries than to others, subject to certain conditions. It held further that these conditions were not met by the EU’s so-called ‘drugs arrangement’, a system of additional preferences (normally duty free treatment) for certain countries which the EU had determined were in need of special tariff preferences, thanks to their involvement in combating the production and trafficking of narcotics. In response to this ruling, when the EU renewed its GSP program in 2005, it replaced its drugs arrangement and two similar, though less generous, labour and environment arrangements with a new arrangement popularly known as the ‘GSP+ arrangement’. Under this arrangement, additional tariff preferences (normally duty free treatment), were made available to developing countries committing to ratify and implement a list of human rights and good governance conventions. According to the EU, the GSP+ arrangement complies with the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the Enabling Clause. This article argues that it does not. This is firstly because of the substantive criteria chosen by the EU to select GSP+ beneficiaries, which do not meet the Appellate Body’s criteria for differential tariff treatment of developing countries. Second, it is because the EU’s requirement that would-be beneficiaries must have applied by a certain date, replicates the problem of the ‘closed list’ of beneficiaries that was fatal to the earlier incarnation of the EU’s GSP program. The article concludes with some suggestions for designing a GSP+ arrangement more likely to meet the Appellate Body’s conditions than the EU’s present arrangement.

I. The GSP+ arrangement
II. WTO rules
III. Application of WTO rules to GSP+ arrangement
IV. An alternative
Annex
Conventions referred to in Article 9 of the EU GSP Regulation





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